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INTRODUCTION 
In many spheres of human activity, the trend is for co-present or physical interactions and 
transactions to be supplemented if not replaced by virtual interactions and transactions by 
parties who are not co-present.  For example, commerce which used to require transactions 
between co-present buyers and sellers, or at least their authorized agents, has been 
increasingly shifting to virtual space since the invention of the telegraph, leading to the 
current wave of massive investments in, and take up of, e commerce.  The delivery of public 
services is increasingly being done without requiring citizens to come to government offices 
in the form of e government.   
 
There is no reason why law breaking, and the deterrence, detection and punishment of such 
acts would be an exception.  The same factors that drive the shift of lawful activities from 
the physical world to the virtual, such as reduction in transaction costs and ability to exert 
control over larger spans of time and space, apply to unlawful activities as well.  In fact, law 
breakers have additional incentives to move away from co-present interactions and 
transactions.  Avoidance of detection may be perceived as easier in virtual space because 
the agents of the law may be at a technological disadvantage vis-à-vis the law breakers.  The 
fact that laws may be lagging criminal techniques may also make the virtual space more 
attractive to law breakers. 
 
Law breakers have been using virtual space for a long time, possibly ever since the telegraph 
was commercially deployed.  Agents of the law have also been conducting their business in 
virtual space for a long time.  Laws have been adopted and courts have issued governing 
decisions.  What is new and different now? 
 
What is different now is the phenomenon popularly described as big data.  “Big data” is an 
all-encompassing term for any collection of data that is very large or complex, and therefore 
difficult to analyze using conventional data processing applications.  Big data was always 
there, but now the conditions exist for low-cost, quick analysis (Mayer-Schonberger & 
Cukier, 2013).  The focus of the present discussion is on the subset of big data known as 
transaction-generated data (also described as “data exhaust”) arising from the day-to-day 
behaviors of persons and the technological devices closely associated with them. 
 
Surveillance is used in a non-pejorative sense in this report.  Its dictionary meaning is to 
keep a close watch over someone or something.  In social theory it is described as the 
control of information and the superintendence of the activities of some groups by others 
(Giddens, 1987, p. 2).  The state is a “human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1918).  
Ensuring law and order is therefore a core function of the state.   To maintain that monopoly 
it is necessary to superintend the activities of groups that challenge the state.  Every state 
engages in surveillance.   
 
States have always sought to control groups within their jurisdiction.   At different times and 
under different state forms, this control has been exercised through different technologies 
of surveillance, among other measures.  In no case has control been total.  Surveillance has 
always been tempered by practical limitations and by constraints imposed to safeguard the 
rights of subjects.  In modern times, state surveillance even for the control of subversion has 
been subject to constraints associated with civil liberties.   
 
The balance between the requirements of the state and individuals with regard to 
behavioral big data is being set at the present time through practice and policy discussion.  It 
is described differently in different countries.  In this report the term “bulk surveillance” is 
used to describe the obtaining and analysis of behavioral big data relevant to maintenance 
of law and order, broadly defined.        
 
Two main types of data are captured: contents of the communication as well 
communications data or metadata, that is, information about the communication (who, 
what, when and where).  For instance, when considering mobile network data, whenever a 
telecom service is being used, a record is generated for billing and record purposes. Call 
Detail Records (CDRs) capture certain types of transactions (such as when a call was made, 
the recipient and duration of the call as well as the cell tower the call was connected to). 
Internet connection records are also included within the broad definition of CDRs.  La Rue 
(2013, p. 3) defines communication data as: 
 
Information about an individual’s communications (e-mails, phone 
calls and text messages sent and received, social networking 
messages and posts), identity, network accounts, addresses, websites 
visited, books and other materials read, watched or listened to, 
searches conducted, resources used, interactions (origins and 
destinations of communications, people interacted with, friends, 
family, acquaintances), and times and locations of an individual, 
including proximity to others. 
 
The acquisition of data in large volumes–bulk data1–could include both the communication 
itself as well as the contents of communication. Bulk data reportedly allow authorities to 
obtain information not readily accessible using conventional targeted means, for instance 
identifying behavior patterns and networks (Operational Case for Bulk Powers, n.d.)  
 
Laws in certain countries mandate the retention of various types of communications data of 
users– this could span from 12 months in the UK (BBC, 2016), two years in Australia (BBC, 
2015), to five years in South Africa (Privacy International, 2017) and Brazil (Privacy 
International, 2017). 2  As expressed by a Danish government representative: 3   “It’s 
impossible to know beforehand which data might be relevant in the future for solving 
criminal cases. Data retention provides investigators with the benefit of hindsight….” 
(Bowcott, 2016).  In many countries, the rules affecting retention of bulk data and who is 
allowed access to them are not public. 
 
In India, the government is developing a Centralized Monitoring System (CMS) to centralize 
the interception of communication data, bypassing service providers.4 Moreover, it is 
reported that the Network Traffic Analysis software is intended to intercept web traffic, 
filtering it to detect words such as ‘kill’ and ‘bomb’ (Privacy International, 2017). 
 
                                                          
1Based on the Operational Case for Bulk Powers. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504187/Operational_Case_for
_Bulk_Powers.pdf    
2 UK – communications data; Australia – telecommunications metadata; South Africa – telecommunications 
metadata; Brazil – data from landline service providers and mobile service providers. 
3 As reported by the Guardian, April 12 2016: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/12/mp-
david-davis-calls-limit-uk-surveillance-powers-european-court-justice  
4 For more information, see 2016-17 annual report of the Department of Telecommunications, 
http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Annual%20Report%202016-17.pdf?download=1  
Proponents claim that the analysis of bulk data can help authorities detect emerging threats, 
particularly in situations where they do not have enough information to conduct targeted 
surveillance. Moreover, after a person of interest (POI) has been identified, an analysis of 
the communication patterns of individuals the POI has communicated with would help 
identify a broader network of accomplices. Proponents state that in fast paced 
investigations, bulk data could provide a sense of directionality enabling prioritization of 
resources to handle the more serious threats.  Once bulk surveillance is used to identify a 
POI, targeted surveillance techniques could then be deployed to obtain more information on 
the target. 
 
In many cases laws governing surveillance have not kept pace with technological 
advancements.  For instance, consider the constitutional challenge launched against South 
Africa’s Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-
Related Information Act (RICA) by AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism in 
2017—one of the areas contested being the lack of regulation on bulk interception.  
 
MODALITIES: TARGETED VS. BULK SURVEILLANCE 
Targeted surveillance is typically conducted on an identified person or group that the state 
deems to be reasonably under suspicion. Law enforcement agencies have leveraged 
targeted surveillance to monitor suspected terrorists and criminals (Council of Europe, 
2015).  Few oppose this type of surveillance.  
 
The other form is bulk surveillance, which captures data across a broad segment of 
population to identify potential persons of interest. Thus, bulk surveillance may be seen as a 
precursor of targeted surveillance.  
 
Instead of the contested term ‘mass’ surveillance (Cannataci, 2017), Anderson (2016) 
focuses on the use of bulk powers such as bulk interception, bulk acquisition and bulk 
equipment interference.  Thus the term ‘bulk surveillance’ is used in this report.  
 
In the use of surveillance to combat crime and terrorism, it has been argued that focusing 
efforts on the small percentage engaged in unlawful acts would enable law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies to be more efficient (Abraham, 2014). Moreover, this would ensure 
that there is no indiscriminate monitoring of a population. As Abraham (2014) further states, 
“In post-facto surveillance, those people who were or are in some way connected to an 
event are targeted.” Thus, permission to violate an individual’s privacy would only be sought 
after a probable cause has been established and there is ‘reasonable’ suspicion (Song, 2014). 
This approach is feasible only when the relevant persons of interest have already been 
identified. 
Proponents of the above approach differentiate between physical space and virtual space, 
believing that all suspects would be identified and probable cause established in the former 
with targeted surveillance then being conducted in virtual space.  This does not correspond 
to reality.  The solution depends on the assumption that all potential law breakers would fall 
within the defined subset identified for targeted surveillance with none being included in 
the excluded-from-surveillance subset.  This is patently unrealistic.  Law breakers have every 
incentive in the world to get themselves included in the excluded subset.  Some 
transgressions of the law occur completely in virtual space.  Their investigation have 
necessarily to take place fully in virtual space. 
INSTANCES OF BULK SURVEILLANCE 
 
Among other things, the analysis of bulk data can help identify POI and provide insights on 
the POI, including their social networks, behavior and movement patterns. It can also be 
used to provide more context on the network environment, and guide decisions on resource 
prioritization (Anderson, 2016). It is possible to classify the use of bulk data to identify 
persons of interest and potential targets (places) before an act of terror is committed, and to 
identify perpetrators after an act of terror. This can be illustrated as follows: 
 
Table 1: Forms of Bulk Surveillance 
 
 1. Person(s) 2. Place 
1. Pre-event  1.1 1.2 
2. Post-event  2.1 2.2 
 
Source: Authors, 2017 
3.1 Pre-event Surveillance 
Everyone in counter-terrorism has a deep interest in preventing terrorist acts, not in simply 
catching the terrorists after the fact, and this is where the appeal of ‘mass’/bulk surveillance 
lies.  From the citizen’s point of view, prevention even of petty crime would be preferred 
over detention, after the fact.  Terrorist atrocities in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Europe 
in the recent past have strengthened the case for expansion of surveillance powers to assist 
in capturing terrorists. Macaskill & Dance (2013) reported that the US National Security 
Agency’s (NSA) justification of data collection is: “The NSA say it needs all this data to help 
prevent another terrorist attack like 9/11. In order to find the needle in the haystack, they 
argue, they need access to the whole haystack.”  
 
In addition to terrorism, there is opportunity to leverage such forms of surveillance to 
combat crime, helping to identifying hotspots for potential crime.  The use of ‘bulk 
surveillance’ can highlight anomalies that would not be visible otherwise.    
 
3.1.1 Pre-event – Person(s) [1.1] 
There have been few concrete/public examples of the use of bulk surveillance in identifying 
persons of interest before a crime/act of terrorism has been used. In the wake of Edward 
Snowden’s revelations, authorities have claimed that that internet surveillance played a key 
role in averting a plot to ‘bomb the New York city subway’ in 2009 by Najibullah Zazi 
(Pilkington & Watt, 2013). However, the role of bulk surveillance in this has been questioned 
(Bergen, Sterman, Schneider, & Cahall, 2014; Pilkington & Watt, 2013). 
 
In 2016, it was reported that Fresno, a city in California was using a tool that generated 
“threat scores” for individuals, (Sadowski, 2016), analyzing “billions of data points, including 
arrest reports, property records, commercial databases, deep web searches and the man’s 
social- media postings” (Jouvenal, 2016). While the software scans an individual’s names 
against public data to generate a color-coded score, how the score is tallied is unclear, 
neither the police nor the public having access to this (Jouvenal, 2016). 
 
Anderson (2016) provides an example of UK intelligence service, MI5’s use of bulk personal 
data sets5 to identify persons of interest who were likely to pose a threat to the 2012 London 
Olympics. The analysis of this data enabled the agency to sift through persons of interest, 
ruling out some, allowing them to focus more on those with greatest value.  Moreover, 
terrorists often operate as a part of a larger network and bulk data can be used to quickly 
identify connections:  
In 2010, a network of terrorists – comprising groups in Cardiff, London 
and Stoke-on-Trent - planned a series of bomb attacks at several 
symbolic locations in the UK, including the London Stock Exchange. 
Complex analysis of bulk acquisition data 6  played a key role in 
identifying the network. The task was made particularly challenging by 
the geographical separation of the groups. Nine members of the 
network were subsequently charged and pleaded guilty to terrorism 
offences relating to the plot. Eight members of the network pleaded 
guilty to engaging in conduct in preparation for acts of terrorism 
(Anderson, 2016, p. 174). 
 




Source: Operational Case for Bulk Powers, n.d. 7 
 
Once a POI has been identified, the individuals communications data can be used identify 
individuals the POI has interacted with.  The common practice is to extend the analysis to 
contacts of contacts, as shown in Figure 1.  Analysis of bulk data can help identify which of 
these contacts had links to extremists already on the radar of intelligence agencies. 
 
3.1.2 Pre-event – Place [1.2] 
                                                          
5 According to MI5, Bulk Personal Datasets refer to: “sets of personal information about a large 
number of individuals, the majority of whom will not be of any interest to MI5. 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/bulk-data  
6 According to MI5, bulk communications data acquisition is: "who", "where", "when", "how" and 
"with whom" of communications, but not what was written or said. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/bulk-
data 




An alternative to identifying a person is the adoption of a place-centric approach.  This 
means identifying a potential place for a crime/act of terrorism before it occurs. 
 
Bogomolov, et al. (2014) sought to identify crime hotspots by leveraging mobility data 
derived from mobile phones, as well as open data such as sales of residential property, 
weather data, transportation data, data on past crimes, etc.  When the “experimental 
results” were compared against real crime data, it showed an accuracy of nearly 40% in 
predicting whether or not a particular location would be a crime spot. 
 
Similarly, in predictive policing, algorithms are used to forecast places where crime is likely 
to occur (Shapiro, 2017). Companies such as Predpol offer law enforcement agencies 
solutions that leverage historical data such as type of crime, location, date and time to 
predict crime (place and time), not predict the perpetrator. By leveraging just these 
variables, PredPol argues that the risk of ‘discriminatory profiling’ is minimized. In 
September 2017, the New India Express reported that a big data solution was being 
developed for law enforcement agencies in five states in India to predict crime (Sharma, 
2017). The solution would model those deployed in the US and take into account crime data 
as well as other data such as weather, dates (e.g., pay day). 
 
Figure 2: Predictive Policing: How it works 
 
Source: Hvistendahl (2016) 
3.2 Post Event Surveillance 
Even in a post-event surveillance scenario, the identification of persons of interest itself may 
entail casting a wider net. For instance, if a crime was committed at a particular place, at a 
particular time, identifying possible suspects may mean first identifying all the people who 
were in the vicinity at that particular time (for example, using a cell tower dump). The 
analysis of call detail records can provide important insights into the mobility patterns and 
social networks of individuals, and provide vital information that could show important 
connections that solve crimes by helping to show what suspects were doing/where suspects 
were before, during and after a crime was committed.  
3. 2.1 Post-event –Person [2.1] 
Moreover, communications data itself maybe leveraged to develop a profile of the 
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Following a failed terrorist attack in London in 2007, the security 
and intelligence agencies were able to confirm that the 
perpetrators were the same as a group who had carried out 
another attack shortly afterwards. This was achieved in a matter of 
hours through the analysis of bulk communications data, and was 
vital in understanding the scale of the threat posed in a fast-moving 
post-incident investigation, because of the ability to identify 
connections at speed; it would not have been possible to do this at 
speed by relying on requests for targeted communications data. 
Through further analysis of communications data, the investigation 
went on to identify people who had had extensive contact with 
telephones used in the London attack. This enabled the security 
and intelligence agencies and police to establish at speed, that no 
further attacks were planned. The operation led to a successful 
prosecution. (Operational Case for Bulk Powers, 2016, p. 41). 
 
Solutions such as those offered by Palantir to Law Enforcement Agencies enable use of a 
single portal to conduct searches across numerous data systems– helping authorities to 
identify relationships between seemingly unrelated sources. For instance in California, the 
Palantir system has integrated the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System 
as well as data from automated license plate readers, and other databases (Harris, 2017).   
3. 2.1 Post-event –Place [2.2] 
This was not explored on the premise that once an event has occurred, there is little point 




Bulk surveillance has been criticized on numerous grounds including, but not limited to 
intrusion of privacy of individuals and suppression of freedom of expression.   
Suppression of civil liberties 
Samarajiva and Lokanathan (2016) state that techniques used to enable location-based 
services can also be used to track movements of groups or individuals for other purposes. 
Indications exist that mobile network big data are already being used by governments to 
identify and control gatherings. In January 2014 text messages warned protestors in Kiev, 
Ukraine, that they were participants in a mass riot: "Dear subscriber, you are registered as a 
participant in a mass riot."  The mobile operators MTS and Kyivsta issued statements 
claiming they were not responsible for the messages. Privacy International (n.d.) states that 
there is “a strong suggestion” that this was done using IMSI catchers. 
Data insecurity 
As the volume and value of aggregated data increases, the harms that can be caused by the 
data falling into wrong hands or being distorted increase.  Increasingly frequent reports of 
breaches of security leading to troves of big data including sensitive personally identifiable 
information falling into the hands of data thieves indicates that the security of bulk data in 
the custody of government or its agents a serious problem.  
Opacity of algorithms 
A heavy reliance on algorithms to generate insights for law enforcement agencies have also 
raised concern, particularly when such algorithms are developed by third parties, who do 
not share the methodology with law enforcement agencies and with the public, in essence 
creating a black box. This is further exacerbated by the fact that if the input data were 
biased, then the results generated by the algorithm would reflect these biases. For instance, 
if an algorithm were only provided crime data for black people, then black neighborhoods 
would be flagged for police patrol (Patel, 2015). 
Panoptical Effect 
Moreover, another concern is that when an individual has reason to believe that he may be 
being watched, there is a tendency to modify behavior, as people strive to conform 
(Panoptical effect).  For example, certain behaviors will be avoided because of the 
probability of observation.  
 
Penney (2016) has demonstrated that concerns about surveillance affect individuals’ online 
activities, adversely impacting the very purpose of surveillance. For instance, it is in the best 
interest of lawbreakers to pass of as law-abiding citizens, striving for conformity. Thus, if 
they are aware that their mobile phones are being monitored, they will strive to work 
around it. For instance, avoiding the use of mobile phones. However, the use of avoidance 
measures may themselves be an indicator. 
 
Legislation and court rulings on bulk data 
In 2016, the UK passed the controversial Investigatory Powers Act. Among other provisions, 
it requires internet and communications companies to collect internet browsing history of 
their customers for up to a year, and it allows intelligence organizations MI5 and 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to conduct bulk communications data 
acquisition (McGoogan, 2017).  
 
However, in recent years, there have been efforts to address concerns around bulk 
retention: 
 
“In the Digital Rights Ireland judgment of 2014,8 the Court of Justice declared invalid the 
directive on the retention of data9 on the ground that the interference, by the general 
obligation to retain traffic data and location data imposed by that directive, in the 
fundamental rights to respect for privacy and the protection of personal data was not 
limited to what was strictly necessary.” (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2016, p.1) 
 
In 2016, the European Court of Justice ruled against the indiscriminate retention of data. 
According to the Press release of the Court of Justice of the European Union (2016, p.1), “EU 
law precludes a general and indiscriminate retention of traffic data and location data, but it 
is open to Members States to make provision, as a preventive measure, for targeted 
retention of that data solely for the purpose of fighting serious crime, provided that such 
retention is, with respect to the categories of data to be retained, the means of 
communication affected, the persons concerned and the chosen duration of retention, 
limited to what is strictly necessary. Access of the national authorities to the retained data 
                                                          
8 Joined Cases: C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, see Press 
Release No 54/14. For more information: 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1
&mode=lst&docid=150642&occ=first&dir=&cid=314051  
9 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 54). 
must be subject to conditions, including prior review by an independent authority and the 
data being retained within the EU.” 
 
In September 2017, “the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) ruled that the European court 
of Justice (ECJ) should decide whether the UK’s bulk collection of communications data, 
tracking personal use of the web, email, texts and calls, is legal,” in the judgment of a case 
brought to IPT of the UK by Privacy International against MI5, MI6 and GCHQ (Travis, 2017). 
 
Even in the United States, there is interest in strengthening digital privacy protection. A 
Supreme Court decision in 2014 (Riley vs. California), the Court ruled that police could not 
search cellphones without a warrant (Liptak, 2014). The New York Times (Liptak, 2017) 
reports that the robbery of a Radio Shack store could potentially impact the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections on privacy. In the case Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 – 
with a decision expected in June 2018 – the Supreme Court is considering if the Fourth 
Amendment was violated when prosecutors collected location data of a prime suspect’s 
phone from cellphone companies. The companies provided records for 127 days. It is 
expected that the reasoning of the Supreme Court would also be applied to other sources: 
bank records, internet search data, email messages, etc. 
 
The New York Times (Liptak, 2017) quotes Chief Justice John G. Roberts:  
 
“Modern cellphones are not just another technological convenience. 
Even the word cellphone is a misnomer. They could just as easily be 
called cameras, video players, Rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, 
libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps or newspapers.” 
Issues of Oversight 
As part of efforts to automate the lawful interception process, the Indian government has 
been rolling out a Centralized Monitoring System (CMS) that is intended to take away the 
process of manual intervention by telecom operators in obtaining electronic data on targets 
through a secure connection. In addition to intercepting mobile phone communication, this 
would also cover landlines as well as the Internet.  Telecommunications Minister, Ravi 
Shankar Prasad, stated that the CMS would enable the "secure flow of intercepted 
communication on near real time basis between law enforcement agency and Telecom 
Service Providers on secured and dedicated CMS network" (Times of India, 2016). The 
Center for Internet & Society has raised concerns that this would enable governments to 
bypass mobile network operators—who are typically informed of interception requests—
and gain direct access to the data, with interception requests now being fielded by the CMS 
authority (Xynou, 2014). 
 
Lawful Access and Transparency  
While the laws compelling communications service providers to provide governments with 
access to communication data of their customers vary by country, they are typically for the 
purposes such as public safety, national security, terrorism and crime. Communications 
service providers receive various types of legal demands: for telecom operators in the US, 
these can range from subpoenas, court orders and emergency requests to search warrants 
and national security letters as well as foreign intelligence surveillance act orders (T-Mobile, 
2015). 
 
The multi-country telecommunications operator, Telenor (2015) segments government 
requests into five categories, namely,  
 Communications data – (i.e. retained/historical data) 
 Lawful interception (real-time interception of communication) 
 Network shutdowns (partial or complete shutdown of an operator network) 
Content restrictions (restrictions that are imposed on the distribution of electronic 
content), and  
 Content distribution (distribution of information from the government to mobile 
users).  
However, not all forms of lawful access maybe disclosed to the public (for example, laws 
may inhibit this or governments may request that this not be shared). Moreover, in addition 
to lawful access, agencies/authorities may conduct surveillance without the cooperation of 
mobile network operators.  
 
Communications service providers are faced with balancing their customers’ interests 
related to privacy and freedom of expression whilst adhering to the local laws of the 
countries they operate in. They try to address this by the publication of reports, typically 
called transparency reports, in which they reveal, where possible, government requests to 
obtain customer data. Facebook, Twitter, Apple, Google, Airbnb are among the technology 
and communications service companies who share this information. 
 
Even in this case however, telecom operators in some countries are not legally allowed to 
disclose statistics on interception requests. Moreover, in select countries, government may 
have direct access to operator data.  Similarly, even if disclosure laws are ambiguous, 
governments may request authorities to not share statistics (Telenor, 2016). 
 
While there appears to be a trend of telecom operators promoting greater transparency, 
some telecom operators appear to be believe that it should ideally be governments that 
disclose this information and not the operators.  For one, no single operator would have 
clarity on the number of requests made in the country as they have visibility to their 
network. One solution is to encourage all operators in the country to disclose relevant 
information.  
However, there may be differences in reporting. For instance, while one operator may 
disclose the number of requests made, another may disclose either a mix of total statistics 
on the number of accounts, devices, subscribers or services that were targeted (Vodafone, 
2014).  There is a difference here. A request may target from one to multiple accounts. 
Additionally, there may be multiple requests to access different types of data for one 
customer. Furthermore, a government may issue the same request to all operators and if 
each operator reports it any of the above ways, this would contribute to the lack of clarity in 
the space. Telecom operators argue that Governments are better positioned to disclose 
requests made to all operators in the country.   
Conversely, if communication data is being used to fight crime, terrorism, strengthen 
national security and improve public safety, it is in the interest of law enforcement agencies 
to keep the public remain unaware or unsure of the nature and scope of surveillance being 
conducted.  The rationale would be that it would make the taking of evasive measures more 
difficult for law breakers. 
CONCLUSION 
It is useful to approach problems of bulk data and surveillance based on the understanding 
that the physical and virtual are best seen as a continuum with different qualities 
predominating in different parts.  Virtual space is not radically different from physical space 
nor is it an appendage of physical space.  This would require solutions to problems of law-
breaking, deterrence, detection and punishment being derived from common principles and, 
wherever possible, from laws that are not “medium-specific,” by which is meant that what is 
a transgression should not change depending on whether it occurred in physical or virtual 
space.  The forms of investigation, evidence gathering, and so on would have to be different, 
but even here, it is advisable to anchor the practices on principles that are common to the 
both physical and virtual space.     
 
The common-law tradition where judges devise remedies for problems brought before them 
works in that manner.  For example, US judges who were asked to decide on the legality of 
supply of pornographic material using postal or electronic means, extended the principle 
community standards originally devised for co-present transactions to those that occurred in 
virtual space.  The exception is where legislatures come up new laws that are specific to 
technologies. 
 
Bulk surveillance can take place before an infraction occurs (pre-event surveillance) and 
after (post-event surveillance).  Pre-event bulk surveillance can focus on people or on places.  
In the case of post-event surveillance, the place is already known.  Therefore it applies only 
to people. 
 
Post-event bulk surveillance is the least problematic of the three forms.  One could say that 
it is the virtual equivalent of investigating all who were present in a location where a crime 
occurred.  The claim, made by some, that bulk surveillance should not be conducted on any 
other than a subset of persons against whom probable cause has been established is not 
consistent with long-established investigatory practices in physical space.  Critics may point 
to the practice of investigating not just the contacts of the persons present at the time of 
the event but also the contacts of the contacts as something that differentiates the virtual 
from the physical.  It is true that this can be done more rigorously in the virtual context than 
in the physical.  However, there is nothing new in the practice itself. 
 
The questions then have to be limited to harms that may be caused by the analysis of post-
event data obtained through bulk surveillance.  One obvious harm is from secondary uses 
disconnected from the original investigation. 
 
The Nepal Supreme Court decision that found illegal the retention and use for different 
purposes of mobile network bulk data collected to investigate a murder points to a solution.  
Laws and investigatory practices will have to be set in place to ensure than bulk data 
collected for a specific investigation will have to be ring-fenced and access to the data in raw 
or processed form limited.  The model would be no different from that which applies to 
paper-based investigatory records and tangible evidence.  These items are kept in controlled 
environments with recorded maintained of authorized access.  In the case of bulk data, the 
safeguards and logs would have to be designed appropriately for the medium they would be 
stored in. 
 
For how long should the data be retained?  Under what conditions should bulk data 
collected for one investigation be used for another investigation after the fact, or for the 
more problematic purpose of pre-event investigation intended to deter or prevent unlawful 
acts?       
 
Bulk surveillance that is conducted prior to an event either to identify or safeguard places 
where laws are likely to be broken or to identify or deter persons likely to engage in 
unlawful acts is where much of the controversy is focused on.  Because humans know that 
predicting the future is difficult and is prone to error, there is a general suspicion about 
government engaging in such actions, especially those that may infringe civil liberties.  
 
One may engage in abstract discussions about the propriety of agents of the state seeking to 
prevent or deter crime.   But in the concrete circumstances of societies facing criminal or 
terroristic threats, there would be no debate about the value of deterring or preventing 
unlawful acts.     
 
There is a concern that unjust laws may be enforced through analysis of data obtained 
through bulk surveillance.  For example, there is a difference of opinion in most societies 
about political protests seeking to topple the government in power.  Some would see any 
action to identify protestors or deter them as wrong and would oppose the use of bulk 
surveillance and data analytics for such purposes.  Others would point to existing laws 
against unauthorized assembly and would see nothing wrong in using normal investigatory 
techniques including bulk surveillance to enforce the law.  The question of what laws are just 
and which are unjust cannot be resolved in this paper.   
 
The questions then have to be limited to harms that may be caused by attempting to predict 
through the analysis of data obtained through bulk surveillance.  One obvious harm is from 
secondary uses disconnected from the original investigation.  The issues of retention of and 
who has access to the data are no different from those discussed above, in relation to post-
event bulk surveillance. 
 
Using bulk data to predict may cause harm because the predictions are erroneous.  An 
example is analysis that points to a particular individual as being likely to engage in unlawful 
activity.  This is may lead to actions that harm an individual’s civil liberties or on the 
operations of an organization.  The safeguards against this form of harm are currently being 
discussed in the broader context of algorithmic fairness (e.g., Bornstein, 2017).    
 
What of the impacts on civil liberties of an individual or on the operations of an organization 
when the prediction is correct?  In one scenario, the prediction will deter.  If the prospective 
law breaker understands that the plot has been discovered, he/she may abandon it.  In 
some cases such the most heinous crimes, it common to define the attempt also as a crime 
(e.g., attempted murder).   
 
In the second scenario, the prospective law breaker continues his/her activities unaware 
that the plot has been discovered.  Given the difficulties of proving the attempt if the 
process is aborted too early, sometimes investigators may allow the activity to continue up 
to a point when they consider enough evidence has been amassed to prosecute.      
   
Both scenarios may occur in the physical world as well as in the virtual.  The only thing that 
may be unique to bulk surveillance has to do with disclosure.  It is relatively simple to 
understand why investigators would not want a suspect to know that his/her plans have 
been discovered.  In the case of searches of physical spaces, most countries require 
warrants, which require disclosure.  In the case of bulk as well as individual searches in 
virtual space the search is not obviously visible as in physical space.  Therefore, it requires an 
additional decision on whether or not to disclose a search.   
 
The common practice with regard to post-event investigations is not to disclose to suspects 
that their communications are being monitored under warrant.  What should the principle 
be with regard to bulk surveillance?  The much criticized practice under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) by the courts established under it was to prohibit all 
disclosure.  An acceptable middle ground may be to allow the companies subject to bulk 
surveillance orders to report the broad outlines of the activity as Telenor does (see above).  
Having an independent authority such as a court consider each request for bulk surveillance 
and authorize each is necessary to prevent abuse.  This is not the case in many countries.  
Disclosing the level of bulk surveillance without being specific would be an additional 
safeguard against abuse.     
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